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Abstract 
Scholars have controversially discussed whether the rise of transnational 
private authority is beneficial or undermines public legitimate authority. While the 
recent focus on civil regulation has emphasized the key role of public authorities and 
civil societies in such arrangements, the case of the International Federation of 
Association Football (FIFA) provides strong evidence that global policies can be 
formulated and administered by completely private institutions relying on strong 
enforcement mechanisms and able to confront public authorities. FIFA’s power 
results from its control of market access to global football, which represents a vital 
club good for national football industries. Therefore, FIFA is able to force European 
Union member states to deviate from national paths of sport regulation. Without 
orchestrating their efforts, public authorities are unlikely to succeed in challenging 
FIFA’s power. Although the recent corruption scandals might force FIFA to 
implement some reforms, FIFA has a vital interest in protecting its regulatory 
powers. 
Keywords: FIFA, Governance, Football, National governments, transnational 
regulation. 
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Introduction 
Football is not only a social phenomenon, but an expanding industry that is heavily 
controlled by the sport’s governing body, the Fédération International de Football 
Association (FIFA). FIFA, a private not-for-profit association with headquarters in 
Switzerland, attributes to itself the powers to govern and regulate world football in 
collaboration with continental confederations and national football associations 
(FAs), from the rules of the game to the social and economic dimensions (FIFA 
2015a, Articles 1-13).  
At the moment, FIFA is engulfed in major scandals. An investigation led by 
the US and Swiss police authorities ended up with senior members of the governing 
body detained to be extradited to the United States, where they face accusation of 
alleged large-scale corruption, tax evasion and money laundering, among others 
(Gibson and Gayle 2015). Misconduct and corruption within FIFA have been 
denounced for a long time (Jennings 2006; Calvert and Blake 2014) and there have 
been numerous calls to increase FIFA’s accountability towards stakeholders and 
public authorities (Lyons et al. 2014). After many years resisting calls for reform, 
FIFA president, Joseph Blatter, decided to lay down his position just days after being 
re-elected by the 2015 FIFA congress. However, Blatter announced that he will 
implement structural changes before an extraordinary congress elects his successor, 
to ensure an improved FIFA remains strong and independent (FIFA 2015b). Thus, 
even in the middle of its most important crisis in decades, FIFA has signaled its will 
to keep in control of the reform agenda.  
While the corruption cases are outside of the scope of this paper, the way 
FIFA muddles through them raises the perplexity of the observer and lead to more 
general questions that form the core of this article: Why has FIFA successfully 
occupied a regulatory space that could have belonged to public authorities given the 
importance of football as a socio-economic activity? Furthermore, how is it possible 
that a private not-for-profit organization with headquarters in Switzerland is able to 
claim and maintain its autonomy from the so-called shadow of hierarchy of public 
authorities (Chappelet 2010)?  
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Indeed, FIFA aims to ‘control every type of association football’ (FIFA 2012, 
Article 2, emphasis added). Here, we explore the different ways in which FIFA 
defends its autonomy to govern football privately in the global and transnational 
market, without the intervention of public authorities. It is necessary to clarify from 
the outset that we do not argue that FIFA has infinite powers in every situation; what 
the article does is to focus on the balance of forces of FIFA, as a private 
organization, vis-à-vis public authorities in the transnational regulation of football. 
Thus, on a theoretical level, FIFA is not just a case study for football enthusiasts as it 
reminds scholars to abandon ‘methodological nationalism’ and to realize that global 
policies can be formulated and administered by completely private institutions (Stone 
and Ladi 2015). Moreover, while scholars have focused on civil regulation 
employing soft law, FIFA illustrates that transnational private regulators can confront 
public authorities by relying on strong enforcement mechanisms. 
The paper proceeds in four steps. First, we review the academic debates on 
transnational private regulation. Second, the paper examines why FIFA rose as a 
transnational private authority. It is argued that FIFA can impose its preferences on 
national governments because it controls access to global football as a ‘club good’ 
vital for national football industries. Third, as main empirical contribution the paper 
presents evidence of how FIFA exerted its power as transnational football regulator 
in three case studies against national governments of Greece, Spain and Poland. In 
the conclusion, we discuss the extent to which FIFA’s multiple roles as regulator of 
the game, transnational corporation and grassroots movement can be contested by 
national governments on their own. We argue that due to football’s character as 
grassroots movement, policy-makers at national level do not trust that the electorate 
will reward them for confronting FIFA. Accordingly, the present crisis might result 
in some organizational reforms, but FIFA is unlikely to waive its regulatory powers 
easily.  
 
Transnational private regulation 
Since Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) governance by non-state actors has increasingly 
occupied the attention of scholars (Mattli and Büthe 2005; Büthe 2010; Shamir 
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2011). Private actors can participate in policy implementation (Pattberg 2005), 
transnational corporations (TNCs) provide public goods for failing states (Börzel and 
Risse 2010) or impose their demands on developing countries (Koenig-Archibugi 
2004). Moreover, private actors are also engaged in transnational private regulation 
(TPR). Building on Pattberg (2005, p. 593) as well as Graz and Nölke (2007, p. 3), 
TPR can be defined as the ability of non-state actors to cooperate across borders in 
order to establish rules and standards of behavior in a distinct issue area accepted as 
legitimate by agents not involved in the rule definition. Thus, FIFA’s regime can be 
conceptualized as a TPR since it establishes rules accepted by national FAs and 
governments. This raises the question of how private regulators claim power and 
how they exert it. 
 Scholars emphasizing the important role for TNCs in TPR claim that 
neoliberal ideology and the pursuit of corporate hegemony account for the rise of 
transnational private authority (Cutler et al. 1999; Johns 2007; Schäferhoff et al. 
2009; Shamir 2011). More functionalist approaches argue that globalization has 
created a mismatch between markets and politics in terms of governance. 
Accordingly, demand for rules has given rise to a variety of sources of supply 
(Haufler 2000). Thus, private actors have assumed regulatory powers in order to deal 
with the necessities of global trade in the absence of international regulations by 
public authorities or effective intergovernmental regulatory action (Bartley 2007). In 
other words, they fill a regulatory vacuum of ‘old international governance’ (Abbott 
and Snidal 2009, p. 577; Schäferhoff et al. 2009; Bomhoff and Meuweuse 2011). The 
rise of private authority has also been framed as resulting from explicit or implicit 
delegation of certain functions by the state (Cutler et al. 1999).  
Thus, there are diverging approaches to explaining and researching TPR. 
Vogel (2007, 2010) has distinguished two forms of TPR: (1) transnational industry 
self-regulation; and (2) ‘civil regulation’. Traditional industry self-regulation has 
been depicted as serving to overcome collective action problems and to reduce 
transaction costs by specifying technical rules and guidelines for various materials, 
products and processes (Vogel 2007; Bartley 2007). In contrast, civil regulation 
specifies the responsibilities of global firms for addressing labor practices, 
environmental performance, and human rights policies (Vogel 2010, p. 68). 
According to Vogel (2010), civil regulation, intended to define standards for 
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responsible business practices, is more likely to be politicized, transparent and to 
involve external stakeholders. In contrast, traditional industry self-regulation is 
depicted as intending to remove business regulation from public scrutiny. Given the 
diversity of industry self-regulation, which often anticipates public concerns 
(Gunningham and Reese 1997; Sinclair 1997; Black 2001) and an on-going debate 
about the rise of the regulatory state, which is supposed to rely on different forms of 
self-regulation (Levi-Faur 2014), Vogel’s dichotomy appears reductionist. Thus, a 
central point made here is that, although global self-regulation is still under 
researched (Porter and Ronit 2006) scholars seem to have recently almost exclusively 
focused on civil regulation. While this interest in civil regulation has certainly 
generated new insights on TPR, it has also neglected some important phenomena.  
First, research has emphasized the role of global civil society for the creation 
of civil regulations on global supply chains (Bartley 2007; Vogel 2010). Second, 
scholars have provided new (albeit diverging) answers concerning the relationship 
between private governance and public authority. On the one hand, scholars stressed 
that powerful non-state actors might challenge the authority of sovereign states 
(Sending and Neumann 2008). In particular, TNCs seem able to impose their rules on 
developing countries (Abbott and Snidal 2008, p. 538). Further, it is also argued that 
TPRs can depoliticize policy issues (Nölke and Perry 2007), which is likely to favor 
private actors over public authorities (Underhill and Zhang 2008). On the other hand, 
Börzel and Risse (2010, p. 116) claim that private governance is still subject to the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’, that is, a credible threat of state intervention. Accordingly, the 
shadow of hierarchy catalyzes ‘voluntary agreement[s] closer to the common good 
rather than to particularistic self-interests’.  
Again, this dichotomous approach to TPR power seems slightly reductionist, 
given the complexities of current societies and economies. Pattberg and Stripple 
(2008; Falkner 2003) argue that the study of transnational civil regulations needs to 
go beyond the public-private divide since civil regulations represent business-civil 
society collaborations involving NGOs and multi-stakeholder organizations (Vogel 
2007; Cafaggi 2011). Accordingly, Abbot and Snidal (2009) have suggested that 
civil regulations of transnational socio-economic activities are actually located in a 
governance triangle between public authorities, private firms and NGOs in which 
civil society or NGOs serve as ‘rule demanders’ and supervisors (Overdevest 2010). 
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Thus, the case of football (or sport) is of academic interest because FIFA acts as 
both, a TNC marketing global football and a civil society not-for-profit NGO.  
Here, the crucial point is that the recent debate on civil regulation has 
depicted an image of TPR as practice that operates besides or around the state. The 
fact that there exist TPRs that can effectively establish rules modifying domestic 
policies against governments’ will is neglected. Moreover, the focus on civil 
regulation has resulted in a narrow perspective on TPR enforcement. It is commonly 
assumed that firms participate in private regulation because the benefits of 
participation received exceed their costs (Lenox 2006). Potoski and Prakash (2005) 
argue that private regulation works because it provides specific ‘club goods’, that is, 
a non-rival but potentially excludable benefits. However, recent research on civil 
regulation has mainly dealt with ‘soft law’ mechanisms. Thus, the club good 
provided by civil regulations is mainly brand reputation, which is essential for TNCs 
(Vogel 2007).  
Thus, two shortcomings of recent scholarship on TPRs are stressed. First, 
attention is called to the persistence of powerful transnational self-regulators able and 
willing to confront national governments. Transnational sport governance represents 
a long-established TPR, which originally filled a regulatory vacuum, able to self-
regulate vis-à-vis public authorities and other third actors. Moreover, the case of 
FIFA provides evidence that powerful transnational industry self-regulation does not 
exclusively rely on ‘naming and shaming’. In contrast, FIFA controls market access, 
which is vital club good for national football industries. The strong dependence of 
national industries on global market access allows transnational private regulators to 
impose their will on national governments. FIFA’s claim for regulatory autonomy is 
exceptional in comparison with attempts to regulate global supply chains. However, 
FIFA’s means of enforcement call for increased scholarly attention on the issue of 
TPR compliance.  
 
Governance and regulation in transnational football  
The governance of international football represents a mixture of a pyramid and a 
network of stakeholders, private commercial actors and public authorities (García 
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2007). FIFA performs a three-fold role in the transnational governance of football: 
Regulation and rule making; fund raiser (through exploitation of the World Cup) and 
subsidizer (of national FAs that receive solidarity funds); and a market gate keeper 
because FIFA membership is a precondition for participation in international football 
competitions (FIFA 2015a). These governance capacities are exceptional even for 
international sport governing bodies (Forster 2006; Forster and Pope 2004). Thus, the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) possesses certainly comparable ‘global 
event power’ (Rojek 2013) as FIFA but its governance covers only the Olympics 
(Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott 2008). Other sport bodies lack FIFA’s strong 
commercial powers posing the question why has risen FIFA to this level of 
regulatory capabilities without real noticeable opposition?  
Research on FIFA’s history suggests that FIFA’s rise to power resulted from 
an institutional first-mover advantage and a complex interaction with the 
‘politicization of sport’ (Tomlinson and Young 2006). Typically established as 
gentlemen’s clubs (Tomlinson 2000) international sport governing bodies filled-in 
into a regulatory vacuum when they created and regulated international competitions, 
because national states did not address these matters then. Thus, the very creation of 
transnational sport governance contradicts ‘methodological nationalism’ (Stone and 
Ladi 2015). The acceptance of these sport bodies’ claim for regulatory autonomy and 
the increasing participation of countries in their tournaments and competitions 
indicate some kind of ‘implicit delegation’ of a TPR regime. The very recent 
recognition by the United Nations (IOC 2014) and the European Union (article 165 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in force since 2009) to 
support the so-called ‘autonomy of sport’, may be interpreted as a more explicit 
delegation of regulatory powers in favor of international sport governing bodies, 
such as FIFA.  
Furthermore, FIFA increased this institutional first mover advantage when 
participating in international competitions came to equal being recognized as 
sovereign state in particular during decolonialization (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; 
Darby 2005). Decolonialization also changed the composition of FIFA’s 
constituency and its expectations concerning FIFA’s role. The new (non-European) 
FIFA members pushed for an increase in World Cup places and financial and 
technical aid (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998). Moreover, these new members elected 
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leaders to FIFA whose agenda was to commercialize the World Cup and to centralize 
FIFA’s control over revenues, in order to share the increased income with the new 
developing football nations (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Murray 1999; Sugden 
2002). As Jennings (2012) discussed for the IOC, massive commercialization 
inevitably required substantial adaptations in organizational governance. In the case 
of FIFA, commercialization served to strengthen its status as governing body as the 
increased revenues were used to grant substantial development aid to member FAs, 
which served to attract even more members (Eisenberg 2006a, 2006b). In return, the 
financial dependence of smaller FAs on FIFA’s support heavily benefitted the power 
of the FIFA executive, and the role of FIFA as a governing body itself (Eisenberg 
2006a; Giulianotti and Robertson 2012). With the exception of the international 
transfer system, these processes of expansion of FIFA, globalization and 
commercialization of the football industry developed with minimal intervention from 
governments and international organizations.  
In result, FIFA claimed control of access to world football. Membership of 
FIFA is a necessary (pre)condition to participate in football’s global competition 
structure, its revenue streams and regulation. Thus, FIFA membership provides 
access to ‘club goods’, which are vital for national football industries. Naturally, this 
provides FIFA with a privileged position. However, within the football industry, 
complex dependencies serve to limit FIFA’s regulatory powers. For example, the 
regulation of clubs activities has generated tensions, especially in relation to transfers 
and release of players for international competition (see García and Meier 2012). As 
clubs employ players, FIFA had to adapt to demands from clubs about compensation 
(Conway 2015). Similarly, FIFA seems to be not always able to monitor its national 
or regional associations. This could be seen in the difficulties to implement anti-
racism policies or in Blatter’s resignation speech where he blamed most of FIFA’s 
problems on the excessive power of the continental confederations that had watered 
down his attempts for reform (FIFA 2015b). However, research presented here 
focuses on the relationship of FIFA with national governments.  
In this context it is relevant that FIFA demands independence from any third 
parties as a pre-requisite for national FA’s membership (FIFA 2012, Article 13.1g). 
In case football’s autonomy is not respected in FIFA’s eyes, the affected country 
may see their FA’s membership suspended by the FIFA Executive Committee or the 
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Congress (FIFA 2012, Article 14). A suspension excludes an FA (including clubs, 
referees, administrators, etc.) from the ‘club goods’ provided by FIFA and is, 
therefore, likely to severely damage the involved football economy.  
In 2005 FIFA decided to implement a strategy to defend the autonomy of 
football over public authorities, hence solidifying its own position within the 
transnational regulatory regime. Moreover, FIFA seems determined to prevent the 
fragmentation of transnational policy implementation and administration, which 
scholars have noted in other global policy domains (Stone and Ladi 2015). 
Accordingly, the 55th FIFA Congress legitimated the creation of a Task Force to 
address contemporary problems of football, among others ‘the quest for autonomy by 
some leagues and political interference’ (FIFA 2005a, b). FIFA demanded national 
governments to guarantee FAs’ control over national leagues and even defined a 
deadline for legal adjustments: 
‘Nations with sport legislation in place that does not comply with the FIFA 
Statutes and especially where leagues are afforded a status whereby they are 
not subordinate to the football association (specifically, Greece, Poland and 
Portugal) shall have until 15 July 2006 to amend the relevant legislation.’ 
(FIFA 2005a) 
FIFA’s Emergency Committee allows the body to quickly respond to non-
compliance or political interference by suspending a country. In addition, the 
Associations Committee (AC) continuously monitors member FAs and public 
authorities where football’s autonomy seems to at stake (FIFA 2008b). Whereas data 
on FIFA’s monitoring activities are not fully accessible, FIFA considers them to be 
effective: 
‘[T]hrough monitoring, communication and reactivity, FIFA can try to 
prevent the emergence of a crisis. FIFA is a strong organization, not only in 
its football realm, but also in the political, socio-economical world, and we 
can and should use this strength to help our members.’ (FIFA 2011) 
As tracing the amount of FIFA’s monitoring activities is difficult, our analysis 
focuses on formal suspensions. A ten year survey allows to infer that conflicts 
between FIFA, national FAs and governments occur quite often since FIFA imposed 
24 suspensions over the last ten years. At least six FAs more have been threatened 
with suspension (Table 1).1 
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***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
‘Governmental interference’ represents by far the most important trigger for 
suspension. Reflecting FIFA’s demand for far-reaching regulatory autonomy, the 
definition of ‘governmental interference’ is broad, including legislative acts adopted 
by parliaments as well as judicial actions against FAs or their officials. Moreover, 
suspensions seem to be effective. A very short period passes between a suspension 
and a lift. More importantly, the outcomes of the conflicts tend to be in line with 
FIFA’s demands. While FIFA aims to involve all stakeholders, it insists on an 
uncompromized implementation of agreements that are in line with its own statutes.  
Thus, an overview of the cases clearly demonstrates the powerful role of 
FIFA as a rule setter in this private transnational regulatory regime (i.e. football). 
However, regulatory compliance does not always equal effective implementation as 
‘repeat offenders’, such as, Kenya and Greece, illustrate. In order to fully understand 
the dynamics of how FIFA enforces compliance vis-à-vis national governments, 
three in-depth case studies on FIFA’s actions against ‘governmental interference’ are 
conducted.  
Enforcing regulation in international football: Three 
case studies 
A case study approach is employed because it is particularly suited to investigate 
processes over a period of time (Yin 2014). More specifically, our research design 
represents a form of ‘theory-testing process tracing’ aiming to provide evidence that 
a certain causal mechanism is present (Beach and Pedersen 2013). In our case, the 
denial of club goods by FIFA is supposed to generate regulatory compliance. Thus, 
we deal with ‘power in action’ (Dahl 1957), which can be measured as the impcact 
of FIFA’s intervention on the behavior of political actors. 
As case study research collects evidence from a diversity of sources in order 
to arrive at relevant conclusions (Yin 2014), research presented is drawn from 
primary and secondary written sources: Official documents from FIFA, national FAs 
and national governments, as well as press reports and academic literature available. 
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However, despite repeated attempts to contact FIFA and the relevant governments, 
not a single positive response was received. To some extent government turnover 
might account for these non-responses. We have mitigated this with the use of public 
documents, press releases and interviews in the press, which are used as a proxy of 
the official position of the institutions. Whereas this is indeed acknowledged up front 
as a limitation of the article, we have taken enough steps to minimize the impact on 
the validity of the analysis.  
Greece, Spain and Poland were selected because they represent countries (a) 
where the rule of law is accepted and (b) where sport policy is made in a 
‘bureaucratic configuration’ in which the sport bodies are supposed to act as agents 
for delivering government specified requirements and where they are accountable to 
the state (Henry and Ko 2009, pp. 30-5). Nevertheless, FIFA forced governments to 
deviate from these regulatory traditions. Moreover, the three cases vary in regard to 
the nature of governmental interference (formal application of state law in Spain, 
political rivalry in Greece, fight against corruption in Poland) and to the intensity of 
FIFA’s intervention (purely informal threats: Spain, formal threats: Poland and 
formal suspension: Greece). For the sake of brevity, our presentation focuses on the 
nature of governmental interference and FIFA’s intervention and regulatory 
outcomes (cf. Table 2, for detailed narratives see online appendix).  
 
***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Nature of governmental interference 
Greece. FIFA’s conflicts with Greece have prolonged since 1990. The first conflicts 
were provoked by the Greek government’s attempt to update governance structures 
in Greek football in response to commercialization and match fixing scandals. In 
1993 the government proposed legislation to overhaul the nomination of referees and 
the composition of sport disciplinary courts in the Hellenic Football Federation 
(HFF) (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a, 2006b). After this attempt had 
failed, the Greek government again tried to tighten the regulatory framework for 
professional sport by proposing a new National Sports Act (Law 2725/1999). The 
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law intended to give the state a greater oversight in governance structures 
(Dimitropoulos 2010; Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a). In contrast, the 2006 
conflict was triggered by the attempt of the newly elected conservative party New 
Democracy to assume control of the sport sector including the HFF 
(Anagnostopoulos 2011, pp. 212-3). 
  
Spain. In contrast, in Spain the conflict arose over a minor technical detail of the 
Spanish Sports Act of 1990 (Law 10/1990), which includes very specific provisions 
regarding the governing structures of professional sport (García et al. 2011). The 
conflict had its origin in the regulation of the Spanish FA’s (SFF) electoral process. 
In December 2007 the government adopted a ministerial order regulating elections in 
all sport federations:  
‘Elections will be made to coincide with the year of celebration of the 
Summer Olympic Games, and must start within the first quarter of this year. 
However, the Spanish sports federations that participate in the Summer 
Olympics shall begin their elections within two months from the end of the 
Olympic Games’ (Ministerial Order 2007, article 2). 
With Spanish football not qualifying for the 2008 Olympics, the SFF was required to 
hold elections during the first trimester of 2008 (Expósito 2008a). However, the 
incumbent president proposed to organize the elections in the autumn implying non-
compliance with the Ministerial Order. Although only involving a technical detail, 
the conflict was intensely covered by the Spanish press (Expósito 2008a, Mateo 
2008a, b). 
 
Poland. As corruption has been endemic within Polish football (Kędzior and 
Szczepanik 2011, Włoch 2013), the government tried twice to address this issue. The 
Polish minister of sport suspended the board of the Polish Football Association 
(PFA) and assumed interim management first in January 2007. After this 
intervention had failed, the government tried eighteen months later again to mitigate 
mismanagement and match fixing within the PFA (Włoch 2013). The government 
waited until UEFA had awarded Euro-2012 to Poland and intervened on 29 
September 2008, just one day before candidates for the PFA board were to be 
13 
 
nominated. In order to legitimize the intervention, the government had now asked the 
Polish National Olympic Committee to nominate a supervisor (Infotuba 2008). 
Nature of FIFA’s intervention 
Greece. In all conflicts, FIFA became involved on request of the HFF, which did not 
accept the government’s initiatives. In response, FIFA threatened to suspend the HFF 
in 1993 implying an exclusion from 1994 World Cup on grounds of excessive state 
intervention (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a). In a similar manner, FIFA 
threatened in 2001 to suspend the HFF ‘from all international football activities’ 
(FIFA 2001a), including the upcoming 2002 FIFA World Cup. FIFA demanded the 
Greek government on 19 March 2001 to ‘immediately refrain from interfering with 
the affairs of the HFF’: 
‘This undertaking has to be made by the Greek government not later than 30 
March 2001. Furthermore, FIFA requests that the required provisions or 
amendments to Greek sports legislation should be carried out and be in place 
by 25 April 2001.’ (FIFA 2001a) 
However, in the 2006 conflict, the threat of suspension did not suffice. After the 
government had failed to comply with FIFA’s deadline, HFF was suspended with 
immediate effect in July 2006 (FIFA 2006a). While the Greek sports minister 
insisted on the government’s right to regulate football governance (BBC Sport 2006), 
the following social and political pressure to comply with FIFA’s demands prompted 
the Prime Minister to intervene personally (Anagnostopoulos 2011, p. 214). 
 
Spain. In the case Spanish case, informal threats sufficed. In February 2008, FIFA 
President Blatter travelled to Madrid to pay tribute to football legend Alfredo Di 
Stéfano. During a press conference, Blatter commented: 
‘This situation in Spain is incomprehensible. We fully support the federation 
and hope that the government understands the risk; FIFA’s Emergency 
Committee could meet in just six hours by phone or electronically to 
suspend the federation’ (Mateo 2008a). 
Blatter deemed the ministerial order an ‘unacceptable intervention in football 
matters’ and indicated possible consequences: ‘It seems as if the Spanish government 
does not want its national team and its clubs to participate in international 
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competitions’ (Expósito 2008a). While the Spanish government signaled to take a 
strong stance (Expósito 2008b; El País 2008) and even suggested that administrative 
sanctions could be imposed upon the SFF (Suárez 2008a), the SFF decided to hold 
the presidential election in November that year (Carbajosa 2008; Ávila 2008). Blatter 
expressed his support:  
‘If [the Spanish government] take[s] any decision against the Spanish FA we 
will have to intervene, and I really do not want to do it. I hope that will not 
be the case’ (quoted in Mateo 2008b). 
 
Poland. Immediately after the Polish government had suspended the incumbent PFA 
board, UEFA and FIFA demanded the removal of the government’s supervisors and 
threatened with suspension and denial of FIFA subsidies. FIFA demanded that the 
‘internationally recognized administration’ of the PFA should organize elections 
under the supervision of UEFA and FIFA (FIFA 2007). The government was also 
sent signals that Poland’s candidature for Euro-2012 might not be considered 
(Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, p. 211). In 2008, UEFA and FIFA also refused to 
recognize the supervisor (UEFA 2008). Furthermore, FIFA threatened Poland with 
exclusion from the 2010 World Cup and announced the cancellation of upcoming 
qualification matches (FIFA 2008). Initially, the Polish government was confident of 
convincing UEFA and FIFA that violations of the law by the PFA justified the 
measure (Infotuba 2008). However, FIFA did not accept these arguments (WPROST 
2008). UEFA even threatened to withdraw Euro-2012 from Poland (Kędzior and 
Szczepanik 2011, p. 212). In a letter to the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, 
FIFA defined a clear deadline ‘of Monday 6 October at noon’ to remove the 
supervisor (FIFA 2008a).  
Regulatory outcomes 
Greece. After FIFA’s first intervention, the government abandoned the proposed 
legislation (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a). In 2001, representatives of the 
Greek government and FIFA met in Zurich (FIFA 2001b) and agreed to reform the 
Greek Sports Act ‘on basis of an action plan proposed by FIFA’ (FIFA 2001b; 
2001c). In result, the government watered down its initial proposals and left the HFF 
structures mostly unchanged (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a; 2006b). 
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Finally, in 2006, just eight days after the suspension, the Greek parliament amended 
the National Sports Act:  
‘Specifically, for the sport of football, all the subjects of functioning and 
organisation of the sport, the Hellenic Football Federation and its members 
are self-governed by the HFF and its bodies, according to its statutes and 
regulations, as well as those that are determined by the Union des 
Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), even if different regulations 
are provided in the law 2725/1999, as it is in effect in the athletic 
legislation.’ (FIFA 2006b, emphasis added) 
Satisfied with this opt-out granted only for football, FIFA lifted the suspension 
(FIFA 2006b).  
 
Spain. Despite much talk through the press, there were no formal proceedings 
opened by FIFA against Spain. Eventually, the elections took place on 24 November 
2008, the preferred solution of the SFF and FIFA (Suárez 2008c). The government 
was surprisingly at ease with that decision (González-Martín 2008). There are 
suggestions of a ‘diplomatic pact’ between the SFF President and the Secretary of 
State for Sport (Suárez 2008b). Formally, the SFF presented a written submission to 
the government in April 2008, simply informing about the decision to hold elections 
in November (Iríbar 2008).  
 
Poland. Facing the threat of suspension and of being not awarded the Euro-2012 the 
Polish government swiftly removed its supervisor (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, p. 
211). Meeting fierce resistance by FIFA and UEFA once more, the government 
agreed to remove the supervisor once the independent election committee of the PFA 
(with participation of the Sport Ministry, FIFA and UEFA) had started preparing new 
elections. While the old PFA board had to admit some misconduct, the new elected 
board tried to suspend all further investigation into corruption within Polish football 
in June 2009. Although the PFA’s general assembly voted the proposal down, the 
PFA’s stance towards corruption remains questionable (Kędzior and Szczepanik 
2011, p. 212). 
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Discussion and conclusion 
Research presented here has explored the extent to which transnational industry self-
regulation persists as a form of TPR able to challenge attempts by national 
governments to set rules in the sector. The cases show that FIFA is able to confront 
national governments and defend its autonomy to regulate football. Suspensions (or 
the threat of them) serve as an efficient means to enforce compliance of national FAs 
and public authorities. Governments even modify their sport policy and legislation 
once FIFA formally or informally requested so. FIFA even defined deadlines for 
governments to comply and devised road maps for conflict resolution. In Greece, 
FIFA obtained a regulatory exemption for football; in Spain, the government 
preferred to avoid conflict; in Poland, the government had to accept a relatively 
lenient stand towards corruption and match fixing. Looking through the list of the 
last ten years provided above, there is not a single case where national governments 
decided to confront, face on, FIFA. In sum, FIFA seems to support claims about the 
undermining effects of private power on legitimate public authority. For scholars of 
global policy, FIFA serves as reminder to abandon ‘methodological nationalism’ and 
to perceive states as dependent rather than independent variable in global policy 
making (Stone and Ladi 2015). 
 FIFA’s power over national football industries and policy-makers seems to 
result from the fact that FIFA provides national football industries an exclusive and 
vital ‘club good’, that is, in participation in global football. Failure to comply means 
that national football industries are excluded from international football, FIFA 
subsidies and protection against player mobility. Thus, FIFA can effectively control 
access to a market, which is essential for the economic viability of national football 
industries. FIFA’s regulatory ambitions probably reflect football’s massive 
commercialization setting strong incentive for the governing body to maintain 
concentrated control over international football and its revenues.  
For scholars of TPR the case of FIFA serves first as reminder that despite 
scholarly focus on civil regulation, powerful transnational industry self-regulation 
persists relying on hard enforcement mechanisms. Once transnational private 
regulators occupy such a powerful position, they are not only able to eclipse the 
shadow of hierarchy but also to challenge national regulations if global market 
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access is vital for national industries. Accordingly, in contrast to the recent scholarly 
focus on civil regulation, future research should pay attention to more diverse forms 
of TPR, their enforcement mechanisms and impact on domestic policies. As 
indicated above, although transnational sport regulation represents a long-standing 
and influential TPR it has slipped academic attention for long.  
As demonstrated, FIFA’s enforcement mechanism allows national FAs to 
initiate a two-level game. FAs are able to invoke FIFA’s intervention against national 
governments. In order to understand why national governments comply it is 
necessary to take the preferences of political stakeholders into account. Besides 
professional football’s economic impact, it seems that FIFA benefits from football’s 
global popularity and the political meaning ascribed to it. After being codified in 
British elite schools in the 19th century, football enjoyed an unprecedented global 
migration and popularity (Giulianotti 1999). Moreover, FIFA benefits from the 
general politicization of international sports (Tomlinson and Young 2006). The 
modern Olympics became quite early a vehicle for national representation though 
sports (Krüger 1995), then for cold war politics (Allison and Monnington 2002) as 
well as for decolonialization (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Darby 2005). Given the 
importance of sport for national identity politics, it seems safe to consider that 
suspension from a national team competition may not be well received by public 
opinion. Here, it is useful to recall the history of Sevilla FC and Celta de Vigo in 
Spain in 1995 (El Pais 1995). Administrative decisions relegated both clubs to play 
non-league football due to insolvency, which triggered public demonstrations of 
more than 250,000 people and finally resulted in a withdrawal of the decision.  
Hence, whereas consumer campaigns account for transnational civil 
regulation, it seems that FIFA benefits from a lack of societal corrective forces. Quite 
the opposite, FIFA presides over a large grassroots movement, acting also as a not-
for-profit NGO in football’s transnational regime when it suits. Therefore, national 
governments seem to be willing to avoid conflicts with FIFA in order not to test the 
consequences of their policies in their voters at the cost of a suspension. This, in turn, 
can explain why FAs can escalate conflicts by involving FIFA.  
Seen in the light of both current scandals and the debate about TPRs, the case 
of FIFA raises the more general question to what extent TPRs can escape becoming 
politicized. Our findings do not necessarily imply that governments cannot challenge 
18 
 
the power of FIFA at all, but that it takes a lot of ‘courage’ for them to do so. So far 
the European Union is probably the only governmental organisation that has been 
able to exert some form of authority over football authorities. The EU requested that 
FIFA amends its international transfer system to some extent (García 2011) and 
forced UEFA to negotiate over the selling of broadcasting rights (García 2008). Yet, 
these interventions were controversial among the member states allowing the football 
bodies to reap substantial concessions from the initial EU demands (Meier and 
García 2012). 
The debates about 2014 World Cup already signaled an increased 
contestation of FIFA’s power. The recent escalation of FIFA’s legitimacy crisis 
indicates that this TPR can become politicized with conflicting demands. However, it 
should be realized that it has taken years of very serious allegations and criminal 
investigations before police authorities decided to act. At this moment, 
dissatisfaction with FIFA’s governance seems to have reached a point where a broad 
coalition of stakeholders pushes for reform. However, the ability of FIFA to ‘resist’ 
as a powerful TPR should not be underestimated even under the present 
circumstances. Here, it is useful to consider the IOC’s Salt Lake City-corruption 
scandal (Mallon 2000; Hamilton 2010). After it was revealed that several IOC 
members had been bribed, the IOC President had even to testify before the U.S. 
Congress. The scandal catalyzed an impressive number of institutional changes. 
Thus, the IOC defined age and term limits for its member, created four categories of 
members in order to increase democratic accountability, reformed the bidding 
procedures and improved financial transparency (cf. Mallon 2000; Wenn and Martyn 
2006). However, these changes did not affect the IOC’s demand for regulatory 
autonomy, revenue maximization and control of the IOC’s commercial assets. In 
other words, despite some changes and opening, the IOC is still recognized as the 
sole authority of the Olympic movement. Therefore, the recent scandal might force 
FIFA to reform its corporate governance in a similar manner. However, it should not 
be expected that FIFA is likely to waive regulatory powers vis-à-vis FAs and 
governments as a broad coalition within FIFA pursues revenue maximization.  
19 
 
Notes 
1 Cambodia, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia and Venezuela. 
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TABLE 1 FIFA’s suspension of member FAs 2003 – 2013 
Member FA Date of 
suspen-
sion 
Date of lift Trigger of suspension Outcome of FIFA intervention 
Azerbaijan 15-Apr-03 23-May-03 External pressure, violations of 
fundamental principles 
Parties agreed to respect a FIFA 
moderated agreement 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
20-May-03 29-Jun-05 Non-specifed Suspension lifted after situation 
had improved 
Guatemala 9-Jan-04 17-May-04 Governmental interference: FA 
and elected FA officials replaced 
Re-installment of elected FA 
leadership, recognition of FAs’ 
competencies 
Kenya 2-Jun-04 6-Aug-04 Governmental interference: FA 
officials  replaced due to 
mismanagement and fraud 
Installment of a normalization 
committee to improve 
transparency and accountability 
Macau 15-Feb-05 6-Mar-05 Governmental interference: 
Non-specified 
Suspension lifted after 
negotiations 
Yemen 12-Aug-05 9-Nov-05 Governmental interference: 
Non-specified 
Suspension lifted after 
concessions by the government 
Greece 3-Jul-06 12-Jul-06 Governmental interference: 
National legislation granting 
professional league independence 
from FA was not revoked 
Legislation amended according to 
FIFA’s demands 
Kenya 25-Oct-06 9-Mar-07 Governmental interference: 
Non-implementation of 
agreements, escalation of internal 
conflicts  
Government declares to abstain 
from further intervention, legal 
proceedings are withdrawn, 
reinstallation of elected officials 
Iran 23-Nov-06 20-Dec-06 Governmental interference: 
Non-independence of decision-
making and election processes 
Implementation of FIFA's 
demands 
Kuwait 29-Oct-07 20-Dec-08 Governmental interference: FA 
officials replaced 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
after new elections are 
announced, reinstallation of 
FIFA’s transition committee, 
amendment of FA's statutes 
Albania 14-Mar-08 26-Apr-08 Governmental interference: 
Government initiated legal 
proceedings against new FA 
statutes 
Legal proceedings stopped, 
creation of a working-group 
Madagascar 19-Mar-08 19-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Ministerial decree dissolved FA 
Madagascan Supreme Court 
declared decree null and void, re-
installment of FA 
Chad 28-Mar-08 7-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA officials 
and intended to hold new 
elections 
Decree revoked, reinstallation of 
elected FA officials 
Iraq 26-May-08 29-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Governmental decree dissolved 
all sport organizations 
Exclusion of FA from dissolution 
decree 
Ethiopia 29-Jul-08 Unknown Governmental interference: 
Dismissal of elected officials, 
non-compliance with FIFA 
roadmap 
Unknown 
Samoa 24-Oct-08 20-Dec-08 Repeated management problems Unknown 
Peru 25-Nov-08 20-Dec-08 Governmental interference:  
Non-specified 
Unknown 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
29-Sep-09 1-Jun-11 Governmental interference: 
Dissolution of FA and creation of 
FIFA’s conditions fulfilled and 
statues amended according to 
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new government controlled body FIFA Statutes 
Iraq 20-Nov-09 19-Mar-10 Governmental interference: 
Government controlled NOC 
dissolved FA 
Dissolution of FA withdrawn 
El Salvador 11-May-10 27-May-10 Governmental interference: 
Government did not accept 
FIFA's normalization committee 
and new FA statutes 
Legitimacy of normalization 
committee and new statutes 
recognized 
Nigeria 4-Oct-10 8-Oct-10 Governmental interference: 
Court actions against FA officials, 
governmentally forced resignation 
of officials, government started 
league without relegation from 
previous season 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
after claimant withdrew legal 
actions and FA leadership and FA 
control over league were 
reinstalled 
Bosnia 1-Apr-11 1-Jun-11 Mismanagement due to ethnic 
divisions  
FA statutes amended according to 
FIFA's demands 
Belize 17-Jun-11 7-Jul-11 Failure of government to provide 
security for national team matches 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
due to positive developments, 
match played outside Belize 
Cameroon 4-Jul-13 22-Jul-13 Governmental interference: 
Government refused to accept 
results of FA elections 
New elections organized, finally 
reinstallation of elected FA 
officials 
Sources: Minutes of the FIFA Congress and FIFA’s press and media releases (cf. online 
appendix).  
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TABLE 2 Overview of the case studies 
Case Time 
frame 
Nature of governmental 
interference 
Nature of FIFA’s 
intervention  
Regulatory outcomes 
Greece     
  Greece 1 1993 Attempt to modernize 
governance structure in 
response to 
commercialization and 
match fixing 
Threat of suspension Legislative proposal 
abandoned 
  Greece 2 2001 Attempt to give 
government more 
supervisory powers 
Threat of suspension Legislative proposal 
watered down 
  Greece 3 2006 Attempt to place party 
allies in football 
leadership 
Formal suspension Regulatory exemption for 
football  
Spain 2008 Formal provision on sport 
bodies’ elections 
Informal threat of 
suspension 
Non-enforcement of law 
Poland 2007/08 Attempt to assume interim 
management to fight 
corruption and 
mismanagement  
Treat of suspension, threat 
of withdrawal of Euro-
2012 
 
 
Online Appendix 
Table A.1. FIFA’s suspension of member FAs 2003 – 2013 
Member FA Date of 
suspen-
sion 
Date of lift Trigger of suspension Outcome of FIFA intervention 
Azerbaijana 15-Apr-03 23-May-03 External pressure and repeated 
violations of fundamental 
principles 
Parties agreed to respect a FIFA 
moderated agreement 
Antigua and 
Barbudab 
20-May-03 29-Jun-05 No details provided Suspension lifted after situation 
had improved 
Guatemalac 9-Jan-04 17-May-04 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA and 
disrespected elected FA officials  
Re-installment of elected FA 
leadership, recognition of FAs' 
competencies 
Kenyad 2-Jun-04 6-Aug-04 Governmental interference: 
Government replaces elected FA 
officials  because of 
mismanagement and fraud 
Installment of a normalization 
committee to improve 
transparency and accountability 
Macaue 15-Feb-05 6-Mar-05 Governmental interference: 
Non-specified 
Suspension lifted after 
negotiations 
Yemenf 12-Aug-05 9-Nov-05 Governmental interference: 
Non-specified 
Suspension lifted after creation of 
a normalization committee and 
concessions by the government 
Greeceg 3-Jul-06 12-Jul-06 Governmental interference: 
National legislation granting 
professional league independence 
from FA was not revoked 
Legislation amended according to 
FIFA's demands 
Kenyah 25-Oct-06 9-Mar-07 Governmental interference: 
Non-implementation of 
agreements, escalation of internal 
conflicts  
Government declares to abstain 
from further intervention, 
pending legal proceedings are 
withdrawn, dissolution of 
government's interim 
normalization committee and 
reinstallation of elected officials. 
Irani 23-Nov-06 20-Dec-06 Governmental interference: 
Non-independence of decision-
making and election processes 
Creation of a transitory board and 
future implementation of FIFA's 
demands 
Kuwaitj 29-Oct-07 20-Dec-08 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced elected FA 
officials 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
after new elections are 
announced, reinstallment of 
FIFA's transition committee, 
amendment of FA's statutes 
Albaniak 14-Mar-08 26-Apr-08 Governmental interference: 
Government initiated legal 
proceedings against new FA 
statutes 
Legal proceedings stopped, 
creation of a working-group 
Madagascarl 19-Mar-08 19-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Ministerial decree dissolved FA 
Madagascan Supreme Court 
declared decree null and void, re-
installment of FA 
Chadm 28-Mar-08 7-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Government replaced FA officials 
and intended to hold new 
elections 
Decree revoked, re-installment of 
elected FA officials 
Iraqn 26-May-08 29-May-08 Governmental interference: 
Governmental decree dissolved 
all sport organizations 
Exclusion of FA from 
dissolvement decree 
Ethopiao 29-Jul-08 Unknown Governmental interference: 
Dismissal of elected officials, 
non-compliance with FIFA 
roadmap 
Unknown 
Samoap 24-Oct-08 20-Dec-08 Repeated management problems Unknown 
Peruq 25-Nov-08 20-Dec-08 Governmental interference:  
Non-specified 
Unknown 
Brunei 
Darussalamr 
29-Sep-09 1-Jun-11 Governmental interference: 
Dissolvement of FA and creation 
of new government controlled 
body 
Conditions of FIFA Emergency 
Committee fulfilled and statues 
amended according to FIFA 
Statutes 
Iraqs 20-Nov-09 19-Mar-10 Governmental interference: 
Government controlled NOC 
dissolved FA 
Dissolution of FA withdrawn 
El Salvadort 11-May-10 27-May-10 Governmental interference: 
Government did not accept 
FIFA's normalization committee 
and new FA statutes 
Legitimacy of normalization 
committee and new statutes 
recognized 
Nigeriau 4-Oct-10 8-Oct-10 Governmental interference: 
Court actions against FA officials, 
governmentally forced resignation 
of officials, government started 
league without relegation from 
previous season 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
after claimant withdrew legal 
actions and FA leadership and FA 
control over league were 
reinstalled 
Bosniav 1-Apr-11 1-Jun-11 Mismanagement due to ethnic 
divisions and rotating FA 
presidency 
FA statutes amended according to 
FIFA's demands 
Belizew 17-Jun-11 7-Jul-11 Failure of government to provide 
security for national team matches 
Suspension provisionally lifted 
due to positive developments, 
match played outside Belize 
Cameroonx 4-Jul-13 22-Jul-13 Governmental interference: 
Government refused to accept 
results of FA elections 
Normalization committee created, 
new elections organized, finally 
re-installment of elected FA 
officials 
 
a. ‘FIFA suspends Azerbaijan’, Media Information, 15 April 2003; ‘Suspension on Association of Football 
Federations of Azerbaijan lifted’, Media Information, 23 May 2003. b. Antigua and Barbuda: ’32 or 36? 
FIFA executive faced with crucial decisions’, Media Information, 20 June 2003. c. ‘FIFA suspends 
Guatemala Football Federation’, Media Information, 9 January 2004. d. ’FIFA suspends Kenya Football 
Federation’, Media Information, 1 January 2004; ‘FIFA Emergency Committee provisionally lifts Kenyan 
suspension’, Media Release, 6 August 2004. e. ‘FIFA suspends the Macau Football Association‘, Media 
Info, 15 February 2005; ‘Full support for German football association and referees’, Media Release, 8 
March 2005. f. ‘FIFA suspends the Yemen Football Association’, Media Info, 12 August 2005; ‘Suspension 
of Yemen Football Association provisionally lifted’, Media Info, 9 November 2005. g. ‘FIFA suspends the 
Hellenic Football Federation’, Media Info, 3 July 2006;’FIFA lifts suspension on Hellenic Football 
Federation’, Media Info, 12 July 2006. h. ‘FIFA suspends the Kenyan Football Federation’, Media Info, 25 
October 2006; ‘Clear declaration to defend the autonomy of sport’, Media Release, 6 December 2006. i. 
Iran: ‘FIFA suspends Iran Football Federation’, Media Info, 23 November 2006; ‘FIFA lifts suspension of IR 
Iran Football Federation’, Media Info, 20 December 2006. j. ‘FIFA lifts suspension on Kuwait on 
conditional basis’, Media Info, 9 November 2007. k. ‘Suspension of the Football Association of Albania 
lifted’, Media Info, 29 April 2008. l. ‘Malagasy Football Association suspended’, Media Info, 19 March 
2008; ‘Suspension of the Madagascan football association lifted’, Media Release, 19 May 2008. m. Chad: 
‘Chadian football association suspended’, Media Info, 28 March 2008; ‘Suspension of the Chad football 
association lifted’, Media Release, 7 May 2008. n. ‘Iraqi Football Association suspended’, Media Release, 
26 May 2008, ‘Suspension of Iraqi Football Association provisionally and conditionally lifted’, Media Info, 
29 May 2008. o. ‘Ethopian Football Federation suspended’, Media Info, 29 July 2008. p. ‘FIFA Executive 
Committee Meeting in Tokyo’, Media Info, 20 December 2008. q. Peru: ‘Suspension of the Peruvian 
Football Association’, Media Info, 25 November 2008. r. ‘Key decisions reached in Rio‘, Media Release, 29 
September 2009; ‘The Executive Committee lifts the suspensions on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Brunei 
Darussalam’, Media Release, 30 May 2011. s. ‘FIFA Executive Committee approves special funding for 
Chile and Haiti’, Media Release, 19 March 2010. t. ‘Suspension of the Salvadoran Football Association’, 
Media Release, 12 March 2010; ‘Suspension of Salvadoran Football Association lifted’, Media Release, 27 
May 2010. u. ‘Suspension of the Nigeria Football Association’, Media Release, 4 October 2010; 
‘Suspension of the Nigeria Football Federation provisionally lifted’, Media Release, 8 October 2010. v. 
Bosnia: ‘Suspension of the Football Association of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1 April 2011 and until further 
notice’, Circular no. 1258, 1 April 2011. w. ‘Suspension of the football Association of Belize provisionally 
lifted’, Media Release,7 July 2011. x. Cameroon: ‘Suspension of the Cameroonian Football Association’, 
Media Release, 4 July 2013; ‘Suspension of the Cameroonian Football Association (Fecafoot) lifted’, 
Media Release, 22 July 2013. 
  
Detailed case study narratives 
FIFA vs. Greece, a Long Standing Conflict 
FIFA’s conflicts with Greece have prolonged since 1990. In 2006, FIFA suspended the Hellenic 
Football Federation (HFF) because of government interference (FIFA 2006a). The decision was 
reversed within a week after FIFA gained a regulatory exception for its governance domain 
(FIFA 2006b). 
 
Early Conflicts. The governance framework of football in Greece was created in 1979 (Law 
789/1979). The football sector did not oppose the law, as it granted public funding 
(Anagnostopoulos 2011; Dimitropoulos 2006; 2010). In 1993, the Greek government intended to 
update governance structures in the face of sport commercialization and match fixing scandals. 
Accordingly, the government proposed legislation to overhaul the nomination of referees for 
league and cup matches and the composition of sport disciplinary courts (Panagiotopoulos and 
Mourniakis 2006a; 2006b). The HFF did not accept the proposals and involved FIFA. FIFA 
threatened to suspend the HFF implying an exclusion from 1994 World Cup on grounds of 
excessive state intervention. The government abandoned the proposed legislation 
(Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006a). 
 
Second Attempt to Regulate Greek Football Governance. In 1999 the Greek government again 
decided that professional sport was in need of a tighter regulatory framework, proposing a new 
National Sports Act (Law 2725/1999). The law intended to give the state a greater oversight in 
governance structures of professional sports (Dimitropoulos 2010) and detailed regulated the 
composition of disciplinary committees, and the election, dismissals and incompatibilities for 
members of the HFF board (Panagiotopoulos & Mourniakis 2006a). After being invoked by HFF 
FIFA demanded the Greek government on 19 March 2001 to ‘immediately refrain from 
interfering with the affairs of the HFF’: 
‘This undertaking has to be made by the Greek government not later than 30 March 2001. 
Furthermore, FIFA requests that the required provisions or amendments to Greek sports 
legislation should be carried out and be in place by 25 April 2001.’ (FIFA 2001a) 
FIFA threatened to suspend the HFF ‘from all international football activities’ (FIFA 2001a), 
including the upcoming 2002 FIFA World Cup. The Greek government responded swiftly, which 
resulted in a meeting at FIFA’s Zurich headquarters chaired by President Blatter and attended by 
the Greek Secretary of State for Sport and the HFF Chairman (FIFA 2001b). The parties agreed 
to reform the Greek Sports Act ‘on basis of an action plan proposed by FIFA’ (FIFA 2001b).  
 An agreement was finally signed in August 2001. According to FIFA, the agreement 
normalized ‘the relations between Greek football and the country’s governmental authorities in 
line with the FIFA Statutes and regulations’ (FIFA 2001c). The government was given a strict 
deadline to adapt the legislation by mid-January 2002. Finally, the government watered down its 
initial proposals and left the HFF structures mostly unchanged (Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 
2006a; 2006b).  
 
Third Round: FIFA Suspends Greece. After the conservative party New Democracy gained 
power in spring 2004 – just months before the Athens Olympics – sport became a top issue in 
Greek politics. Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis took personal charge of the preparations for the 
Olympic Games, seizing control of the culture ministry (responsible for sport) and appointing 
personal allies in key positions within the public sports sector (Carr 2004).  
The government also proposed changes to the National Sports Act. Sport federations in 
the country were given six months to amend their statutes, including election systems 
(Panagiotopoulos and Mourniakis 2006b). The legislation appears to have been intended to 
assume political control of the Greek FA (Anagnostopoulos 2011, pp. 212-3). At least the 
incumbent HFF chairman, Vasilios Gagatsis, felt that the amendments reduced his chances for 
reelection. After HFF elections were finally held without changes in the electoral system, the 
Greek sport minister withheld all state funding of the HFF.  
After another HFF complaint, FIFA, in September 2005, gave Greece a deadline of 15 
July 2006 to amend the legislation (FIFA 2005a). When the government failed to comply, FIFA 
formally suspended the HFF with immediate effect in July 2006 (FIFA 2006a). While the Greek 
sports minister insisted on the government’s right to regulate football governance (BBC Sport 
2006), the suspension and the following social and political pressure to comply with FIFA’s 
demands prompted the Prime Minister to intervene personally (Anagnostopoulos 2011, p. 214). 
Just eight days after the suspension, the Greek parliament amended the National Sports Act:  
‘Specifically, for the sport of football, all the subjects of functioning and organisation of 
the sport, the Hellenic Football Federation and its members are self-governed by the HFF 
and its bodies, according to its statutes and regulations, as well as those that are 
determined by the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) and the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), even if different regulations are 
provided in the law 2725/1999, as it is in effect in the athletic legislation.’ (FIFA 2006b, 
emphasis added) 
Satisfied with this opt-out granted only for football, FIFA lifted the suspension (FIFA 2006b). 
The fact that FIFA obtained a full exemption of the HFF from the most important piece of 
legislation that regulates the sport sector clearly indicates FIFA’s bargaining power.  
FIFA vs. Spain: Informal Persuasion  
In Spain the regulation of the sports sector is laid down in the Spanish Sports Act of 1990 (Law 
10/1990), complemented with subsequent ministerial orders or decrees (Puig et al. 2010). The 
Act includes very specific provisions regarding the governing structures of professional sport 
(García et al. 2011). Thus, the Act defines the roles and responsibilities of sport federations. 
Federations are described as private entities acting by delegation of the state (Law 10/1990, 
Article 30). Ultimately, conflicts with FIFA arose in the spring of 2008 when the national team 
had already qualified for Euro-2008. 
 
Electoral Processes. The conflict had its origin in the regulation of the Spanish FA’s (SFF) 
electoral process. In December 2007 the government adopted a ministerial order regulating 
elections in all sport federations:  
‘Elections will be made to coincide with the year of celebration of the Summer Olympic 
Games, and must start within the first quarter of this year. However, the Spanish sports 
federations that participate in the Summer Olympics shall begin their elections within two 
months from the end of the Olympic Games’ (Ministerial Order 2007, article 2). 
With Spanish football not qualifying for the 2008 Olympics, the SFF was required to hold 
elections during the first trimester of 2008 (Expósito 2008a). However, the incumbent president, 
Angel Villar, proposed to organize the elections in the autumn implying non-compliance with the 
Ministerial Order. The conflict about a relatively minor technical detail gained increased public 
attention through constant reporting by the Spanish press (Expósito 2008a; Mateo 2008a, b).  
 
FIFA’s threat to the Spanish Government. In February 2008, FIFA President Blatter travelled to 
Madrid to pay tribute to football legend Alfredo Di Stéfano. During a press conference, Blatter 
commented: 
‘This situation in Spain is incomprehensible. We fully support the federation and hope 
that the government understands the risk; FIFA’s Emergency Committee could meet in 
just six hours by phone or electronically to suspend the federation’ (Mateo 2008a). 
Blatter deemed the ministerial order an ‘unacceptable intervention in football matters’ and 
indicated possible consequences: ‘It seems as if the Spanish government does not want its 
national team and its clubs to participate in international competitions’ (Expósito 2008a).  
The Spanish Secretary of State for Sport took first a strong stance: ‘I defend the 
sovereignty of the Spanish state and the rule of law; we shall respect and enforce the law, and 
Spanish sport shall be governed in Spain’ (quoted in Expósito 2008b; El País 2008). It was even 
suggested that administrative sanctions could be imposed upon the SFF (Suárez 2008a). 
However, in March 2008 the SFF  Annual General Meeting decided the presidential election 
would be held in November that year (Carbajosa 2008; Ávila 2008). Blatter expressed his 
support:  
‘If [the Spanish government] take[s] any decision against the Spanish FA we will have to 
intervene, and I really do not want to do it. I hope that will not be the case’ (quoted in 
Mateo 2008b). 
Despite much talk through the press, there were no formal proceedings opened by FIFA against 
Spain, unlike the Greek case above. This makes harder tracing the resolution of the conflict. The 
elections took place on 24 November 2008, the preferred solution of the SFF and FIFA (Suárez 
2008c). The government was surprisingly at ease with that decision: ‘Those who think that this 
delay is not complying with our own ministerial order are wrong’ (quoted in González-Martín 
2008). There are suggestions of a ‘diplomatic pact’ between the SFF President and the Secretary 
of State for Sport (Suárez 2008b), but there are no public explanations of the government’s 
change of mind. Formally, the SFF presented a written submission to the government in April 
2008, simply informing about the decision to hold elections in November (Iríbar 2008).  
The informal character of the Spanish makes a clear-cut analysis difficult. Given the 
technical nature of the issue at stake, it is plausible that the government appreciated the 
unnecessary negative consequences that a formal FIFA intervention could have. Thus, the power 
of transnational football governance serves to discourage public authorities from upsetting the 
governing bodies. 
FIFA vs. Poland: Protecting incapable governance  
Poland has also an interventionist legislative framework for professional sport (Kędzior and 
Szczepanik 2011). The Law on Qualified Sport of 2005 granted the Minister of Sport substantial 
powers over sport associations (Radke 2009). Certain business activities required ministerial 
approval if an association received public funding. Moreover, in case of violations of the law the 
minister could suspend the authorities of the association, withdraw its consent for the creation of 
an association or file a motion for a resolution of an association to a Polish court (Szwedo 2011, 
p. 63). These stipulation became relevant since corruption has been an endemic problem within 
Polish football. The problem’s magnitude was revealed after the Polish penal code, in 2003, 
included the notion of ‘sporting bribery’. Several hundred people including top officials of the 
Polish Football Association (PFA) have been charged because of match fixing and corruption 
(Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011; Włoch 2013).  
 
First Round: Responding to Governance Failures. The government decided to intervene when the 
PFA only hesitantly addressed bribery. In January 2007 the Polish minister of sport suspended 
the PFA board and assumed interim management. The incumbent board deemed the measure to 
violate the autonomy of sport. It was supported by UEFA and FIFA, which demanded the 
removal of the government’s supervisors. FIFA threatened the government not only with 
suspension but also with denial of FIFA’s subsidies. FIFA demanded that the ‘internationally 
recognized administration’ of the PFA should organize elections under the supervision of UEFA 
and FIFA (FIFA 2007). The government was also sent signals that Poland’s candidature for Euro-
2012 might not be considered. Thus, the government removed its supervisor (Kędzior and 
Szczepanik 2011, p. 211). 
 
Second Round: Intervening with Support from Polish Sport: Eighteen months later, the 
government tried again to mitigate mismanagement and a hesitant approach to match fixing 
within the PFA (Włoch 2013). The government waited until UEFA had awarded Euro-2012 to 
Poland and intervened on 29 September 2008, just one day before candidates for the PFA board 
were to be nominated. In order to legitimize the intervention, the government asked the Polish 
National Olympic Committee (NOC) to nominate a supervisor (Infotuba 2008).  
UEFA and FIFA refused to recognize the supervisor and asked the IOC to assess the 
autonomy of the Polish NOC (UEFA 2008). Furthermore, FIFA threatened Poland with exclusion 
from the 2010 World Cup and announced the cancellation of upcoming qualification matches 
(FIFA 2008b). Initially, the Polish Sport Minister, Miroslaw Drzewiecki was confident of 
convincing UEFA and FIFA that violations of the law by the PFA justified the measure (Infotuba 
2008a, WPROST 2008a). However, FIFA did not accept these arguments (WPROST 2008c). 
UEFA even threatened to withdraw Euro-2012 from Poland (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, p. 
212).  
In a letter to the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, FIFA defined a clear deadline ‘of 
Monday 6 October at noon’ to remove the supervisor (FIFA 2008a). In response, Minister 
Drzewiecki demanded the PFA to respect the law and claimed: ‘you cannot supervise the fight 
against corruption and hooliganism if you break the law yourself’ (WPROST 2008d; e). 
Nevertheless, Drzewiecki negotiated with the incumbent PFA board. Finally, the government 
agreed to remove the supervisor once the independent election committee of the PFA (with 
participation of the Sport Ministry, FIFA and UEFA) had started preparing new elections. While 
the old PFA board had to admit some misconduct, the new elected board tried to suspend all 
further investigation into corruption within Polish football in June 2009. Although the PFA’s 
general assembly voted the proposal down, the PFA’s stance towards corruption remains 
questionable (Kędzior and Szczepanik 2011, p. 212).  
Since the willingness to host EURO-2012 seems decisive for the actions of the 
government, the Polish case illustrates the positive effects that football governance system creates 
for its constituents. National governments are happy to exploit football’s political and economic 
value when they can, even if they have to share regulatory powers. 
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